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THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
Ilya Somint

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's controversial 2005 decision in Kelo v. City
of New London' focused public attention on takings for "economic
development." The Kelo Court held that the condemnation of private

property for transfer to other private owners is a constitutional "public
use" under the Fifth Amendment even if the only justification for
doing so was the hope that the transfer would increase "economic

development" in the area.
The case generated an enormous and unprecedented political

backlash, with forty-two states and the federal government all
enacting legislation intended to curb eminent domain in its aftermath.
This Essay briefly considers some of the reasons why economic
development takings are vulnerable to "capture" by powerful interest
groups, and therefore unlikely to produce benefits for
communities that outweigh their harms. It also considers some of the
shortcomings of the political backlash against Kelo. The majority of

the reform laws enacted over the last three years are likely to prove
ineffective.

In both cases, a key culprit is widespread public

t Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I would like to
thank Susan Courtwright-Rodriguez and Anthony Messuri for invaluable research assistance,
and participants in the Case Western Reserve University Symposium on "Corporations and their
Communities" for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For my analysis and critique of Kelo's holding, see Ilya Somin,
Controllingthe GraspingHand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SuP. CT. ECON.
REV. 183, 224-33 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, GraspingHand].
2 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-84.
3 For a survey of these laws, see Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
Political Response to Kelo, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=976298 [hereinafter Somin, Limits of Backlash].
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ignorance. The ignorance of voters makes it difficult or
impossible for them to effectively monitor economic development
takings and prevent interest group capture. It also reduces the odds of
enacting effective-as opposed to purely symbolic-legislation
banning such condemnations.
In putting forward these two hypotheses, I draw extensively on a
prior article analyzing Kelo and economic development takings,4 and
on a forthcoming one that provides a comprehensive analysis of the
Kelo backlash. 5 Many of the relevant arguments are developed more
fully in those two pieces than is possible here. The function of this
Essay is to tie the main themes of the two longer articles together and
show how political ignorance affects both economic development
takings and attempts to enact legislation to abolish them.
I. "CAPTURE," RENT-SEEKING, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
TAKINGS

Economic development takings are not the only exercises of the
eminent domain power vulnerable to capture by interest groups
seeking to use the powers of government for their own benefit ("rentseeking" as it is known in the literature). Indeed, interest group
capture of government agencies and rent-seeking are serious dangers
for a wide range of government activities.6 However, there are three
major reasons why economic development takings are especially
vulnerable to this threat: the nearly limitless applicability of the
economic development rationale; severe limits on electoral
accountability caused by low transparency; and time horizon
problems.
A. Nearly Limitless Scope
The economic development rationale for takings can potentially
justify almost any condemnation that benefits a commercial
enterprise. As the Michigan Supreme Court explained in its 2004
decision invalidating the economic development rationale under its
state constitution:
[The] "economic benefit" rationale would validate practically
any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a
4 See Somin, GraspingHand,supra note 1.
5 See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3.
6 For a useful summary of the literature on rent-seeking and capture, see DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 333-58 (2003).
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private entity. After all, if one's ownership of private property
is forever subject to the government's determination that
another private party would put one's land to better use, then
the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by
the expansion plans of any large discount retailer,
"megastore," or the like.7
Courts in at least two of the other states that forbid economic
development takings have reached the same conclusion. The
Supreme Court of Illinois recently refused to allow a "contribu[tion]
to positive economic growth in the region" to justify a taking because
such a standard could justify virtually any condemnation that
benefited private industry since "every lawful business" contributes to
economic growth to some degree. 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky banned the economic development rationale in 1979 largely
because "[w]hen the door is once opened to it, there is no limit that
can be drawn." 9 The U.S. Supreme Court dissenters in Kelo have also
focused on this threat, warning that "nearly all real property is
susceptible to condemnation on the Court's theory"
that the economic
0
development rationale is a sufficient justification.'
Those decisions and dissents may slightly overstate the case, but
their basic logic is sound. Economic development can rationalize
virtually any taking that benefits a private business because 'any such
entity can claim that its success might "bolster the economy.
Such a protean rationale for the use of eminent domain exacerbates
the danger of interest group capture by greatly increasing the range of
interest groups that can potentially use it. By the same token, it also
increases the range of projects that those interest groups can hope to
build on condemned land that is transferred to them; presumably, any
project that might increase development or produce tax revenue
would be acceptable. Finally, the wide range of projects and interest
groups involved makes it more difficult for rationally ignorant voters
to assess the takings in question.' 2 All three factors tend to increase
the attractiveness of eminent domain condemnations as a means of
making political payoffs to powerful interest groups.
7 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
8 Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (111. 2002).
9Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1979) (quoting 26 Am. JUR. 2D
Eminent Domain § 34, at 684-85 (1966)).
10Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981),
overruledby County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
12See the discussion of rational ignorance in Part LB, infra.
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B. Severely ConstrainedElectoralAccountability
Interest group manipulation of economic development takings
could be curtailed if public officials responsible for condemnations
faced credible threats of punishment at the polls after they approved
condemnations that reward rent-seeking. Unfortunately, such
punishment is highly unlikely for two important reasons. First, the
calculation of the costs and benefits of most development projects is
extremely complex, and it is difficult for ordinary voters to
understand whether a particular project is cost-effective or not.
Studies have repeatedly shown that most voters have very little
knowledge of politics and public policy.' 3 Most are often ignorant
even of basic facts about the political system.14 Such ignorance is
neither an accident nor a consequence of "stupidity." It is in fact a
rational response to the insignificance of any one vote to electoral
outcomes. If a voter's only reason to become informed is to ensure
that she votes for the "best" candidate in order to ensure that
individual's election to office, this turns out to be almost no incentive
to acquire knowledge at all. The likelihood that any one vote will be
decisive is infinitesimally small, thereby making it irrational for
individual voters to acquire significant knowledge if influencing
electoral outcomes is the only reason for doing so.' 5 Such rational
ignorance is likely to be an even more serious problem in a complex
and nontransparent field such as the evaluation of economic
development takings.
While the same danger may exist with some traditional takings,
these takings usually at least produce readily observable benefits such
as a road or a bridge-public assets that can be seen and used by the
average voter. Moreover, these benefits usually become apparent as
soon as the project in question is completed. By contrast, the alleged
public benefit of economic development takings is a generalized
contribution to the local economy that the average citizen often will
not notice, much less be able to measure.
Second, even if voters were much better informed, democratic
accountability for economic development takings may still often be
inadequate. Unlike with most conventional takings, the success or
failure of a project made possible by economic development
13See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New
Perspective on the "Central Obsession" of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287,
1290-1304 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, PoliticalIgnorance] (summarizing evidence of extensive
voter ignorance); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV.
413, 413-19 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance and the DemocraticIdeal] (same).
14Somin, Voter Ignoranceand the DemocraticIdeal, supra note 13, at 416-19.
15See id. at 435-38 (providing a more detailed discussion).
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condemnations is usually apparent only years after the condemnation
takes place. In the famous 1981 Poletown case,1 6 some 4,000 Detroit
residents were forcibly expelled from their homes as part of a
condemnation intended to provide land for General Motors to build a
new factory. 17 Yet the factory did not even open until 1985, four years
after the 1981 condemnations and two years behind schedule.18 And
not until the late 1980s did it become clear that the plant would
produce far less than the expected 6,000 jobs.1 9 It is highly likely that
the costs of the Poletown takings ultimately outweighed the
benefits.2 °
By that time, of course, public attention had likely moved on to
other issues, and, in any event, many of the politicians who had
approved the 1981 condemnations might no longer be in office.
Moreover, even if a political leader in question is still in office, and
voters do check to see whether the promises made years ago have
been kept, it will still be difficult for voters to tell whether the
resulting economic development was greater than what might have
occurred had the land not been condemned, and its preexisting owners
left in place.
Given such limited time horizons, a rational, self-interested Detroit
political leader might well have been willing to support the Poletown
condemnations even if he anticipated that the expected benefits would
eventually fail to materialize. By the time that became evident to the
public, he could be out of office. In the meantime, he could benefit
from an immediate increase in political support from General Motors
and other private interests benefiting from the taking.
Some argue that such abusive condemnations will be constrained
by the power of property owners over local governments. Because
property owners are the dominant interest in many localities, 2' they
may be able to use their political power to prevent abusive economic
development condemnations. However valid this argument is with
respect to other functions of local government, it is flawed when
applied to economic development takings. Because of their
nontransparent nature and the general problem of widespread
16 304N.W.2d455.
17 For a detailed analysis of the case, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004

MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, Overcoming Poletown].
18 JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 214 (1989).

19Id. at 214-15.
20 See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 17, at 1016-19.

21 See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) (providing
extensive evidence of the ability of homeowners to influence local governments to adopt
policies that protect their interests and maximize property value).
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ignorance, property owners are unlikely to be able to determine which
development condemnations serve their interests and which do not.
Moreover, even in situations where voters do understand the tradeoffs
involved, the relevant variable is not the political power of property
owners generally, but the power of those who are targeted for
condemnation. As in Poletown, these are likely to be poor,
politically unorganized or both. 2 Even if property owners are
politically powerful as a group, this fact will not prevent eminent
domain abuse if such abuses usually target subsets of owners who are
politically weak.
Similarly, the political power of the press as a whole will not
prevent government from violating free speech rights if such
violations usually target segments of the press that are politically
unpopular or have little lobbying power. Just as the influence of the
press does not obviate the need for judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment, the political power of property owners cannot
substitute for judicial review of economic development takings.
II. THE KELO BACKLASH AND ITS LIMITS
A. The PoliticalBacklash Against Kelo
Prior to the Kelo decision, economic development takings had not
been a major political issue. Only one state legislature-Utahpassed legislation banning such condemnations in the years
immediately prior to the decision.23 The Kelo decision focused public
attention on the issue and generated an unprecedented political
backlash. Some forty-two states, as well as the federal government,
enacted laws purporting to ban or restrict economic development
takings.24 This constitutes a more extensive legislative response than
that generated by any other Supreme Court decision in recent
decades.25 Opinion polls showed that 81 to 95 percent of the public
22
23

See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 17, at 1019.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (West 2005) (outlining powers of redevelopment

agencies and omitting the power to use eminent domain for blight alleviation or development);

see

also

Henry

Lamb,

Redevelopment Agencies, ENV'T

Utah
&

Bans

CLIMATE NEWS,

Eminent
June

Domain
2005,

at

Use

by

1, available at

http://www.heartland.org/article.cfm?artlD=17162 (describing the politics behind the Utah law).
In March 2007, Utah partially rescinded its ban on blight condemnations.
See H.B. 365, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2007 Utah Laws 379 (permitting blight condemnations if
approved by a supermajority of property owners in the affected area).
24 For a description of these laws, see Somin, Limits of Backlash,supra note 3.
25The closest competitor is Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), which struck down
all then-existing state death penalty laws. In response, some thirty-five states and the federal
government enacted new death penalty statutes between 1972 and 1976 intended to conform to
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disapproved of the Supreme Court's decision.2 6 Some 63 percent of
the public not only disapproved of Kelo, but did so "strongly. ' 27 This
anti-Kelo consensus cut across party ideological, racial, and gender
lines.28 A later survey showed 71 percent of the public supported the
enactment of state laws forbidding economic development takings.29
Both liberal and conservative politicians and activists rushed to
denounce Kelo. Among those who did so were Bill Clinton, Rush
Limbaugh, Ralph Nader, Maxine Waters, and Howard Dean.3 °
The vehemence and scope of the backlash against Kelo led some
prominent scholars and jurists-including Richard Posner and
soon-to-be Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts-to suggest
that judicial protection of property rights against economic
development takings was superfluous or unnecessary.3' Such claims
have turned out to be premature at best.
As I show in a forthcoming comprehensive study of post-Kelo
reform, the majority of the federal and state laws enacted in the
aftermath of Kelo are likely to have little or no effect in actually
constraining economic development takings. 32 This is true of twentyone of thirty-five reform laws enacted by state legislatures, 33 and also
of all the reforms enacted by the federal government.34 Moreover,
many of the states that have passed effective reforms are ones that
rarely, if ever, used economic development takings to begin with.
Most of the states that engaged in the largest number of Kelo-style

Furman's requirements. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976) (noting that
"at least 35 States" and the federal government had enacted new death penalty statutes in
response to Furman, and listing the laws in question).
26 Somin, Limits of Backlash, supranote 3, at 8 tbl. 1.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id.at 7-8.

29 Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1931, 1940 tbl.2 (2007).
30 Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 2-3, 6-7.
31See Richard A. Posner, Foreword:A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 98 (2005)
(claiming that "the strong adverse public and legislative reactions to the Kelo decision" are
justifications of the decision). At his confirmation hearing before the Senate, then-Judge John
Roberts commented that the legislative reaction to Kelo shows that "this body [Congress] and
legislative bodies in the states are protectors of the people's rights as well" and "can protect
them in situations where the court has determined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that they are not
going to draw that line." Transcript: Day Three of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/09/14/ar2005091401445.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
32 Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3.
33Id. at 16-34.
34Id. at 38-43.
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condemnations in the years prior to the Supreme Court's decision
have enacted ineffective reforms or none at all.35
B. The Impact of PoliticalIgnorance
Why this pattern of largely ineffective reform? I tentatively
suggest that the same political ignorance that plays a crucial role in
magnifying the flaws of economic development takings also makes it
difficult to enact effective legislation banning them.
1. Public IgnoranceAbout Post-Kelo Reform
As noted earlier,3 6 the majority of voters are "rationally ignorant"
about most aspects of public policy because there is so little chance
that an increase in any one voter's knowledge would have a
significant impact on policy outcomes. No matter how knowledgeable
a voter becomes, the chance that his or her better-informed vote will
actually swing an electoral outcome is infinitesimally small. There is,
therefore, very little incentive for most citizens to acquire information
about politics and public policy-at least so 37
long as their only reason
to do so is to become better-informed voters.
Recent survey data compiled at my request by the Saint Consulting
Group, a firm that sponsors surveys on land use policy, confirms the
hypothesis that most Americans have little or no knowledge of postKelo reform. 38 They show that political ignorance about post-Kelo
reform is widespread. Only 13% of respondents could both correctly
answer whether or not their states had enacted eminent domain
reform laws since 2005, and correctly answer a follow-up question
about whether or not those laws were likely to be effective in
preventing condemnations for economic development.3 9 Only 21%
could even correctly answer the first question in the sequence:
whether or not their state had enacted eminent domain reform since
Kelo was decided in 2005.40

35 Id. at 13-16.

See supra Part I.B.
37 For a more detailed discussion of the theory of rational ignorance, see llya Somin,
Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of PoliticalInformation, 18 CRITICAL
36

REV. 255 (2006); see also Somin, PoliticalIgnorance, supra note 13. The concept of rational
political ignorance was first developed in ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 238-59 (1957).
38 The data in question was produced by the August 2007 Saint Index survey, which
polled a random sample of 1000 Americans over the age of twenty-one. For full details on the
survey and question wording, see Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 43-49, 63 app. b.
39 For the exact wording of the two questions involved, see id. at 63 app. b.
40 Data calculated from Saint Index 2007, Question 9. See id.
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It is also important to recognize that 6% of respondents believed
that their states had enacted post-Kelo reforms that were likely to be
"effective" in reducing economic development takings even though
the state in fact had not. This is not a large number in absolute terms,
but it still represents more than one-third of the 17% of respondents
who expressed any opinion at all about the effectiveness of their
state's reforms. 41 An additional 2% wrongly believed that their states'
reform laws were ineffective even though the opposite was in fact
true. Even among the 17% of Americans who paid close enough
attention to post-Kelo reform legislation to have an opinion about its
effectiveness, there was a high degree of ignorance.4 2
Ignorance about states' post-Kelo reform cut across gender, racial,
and political lines. Some 85% of men and 90% of women were
ignorant about the condition of post-Kelo reform in their states, as
were 82% of African-Americans, 89% of whites, and similar
overwhelming majorities of liberals and conservatives, Democrats
and Republicans, and other groups.4 3 It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that most Americans are ignorant about the mere
existence, or lack thereof, of post-Kelo reform in their states, and
even fewer can tell whether the reform was effective or not.
The Saint Index data may even understate the amount of ignorance
about post-Kelo reform. Several factors suggest that its estimates of
public knowledge are biased upward. 44
The fact that most citizens are ignorant about post-Kelo reform is
not surprising to public opinion researchers. Large majorities know
little or nothing about far more important policies.4 5 For example,
polls conducted around the time of the 2004 election showed that
70% of Americans did not know that Congress had recently enacted a
massive prescription drug bill, and 58% admitted that they knew little
or nothing about the controversial USA Patriot Act.46 What may be
somewhat surprising-especially to nonexpert observers-is that

41 Data calculated Saint Index 2007, Question 10. See id.
42 Only 17% of respondents expressed any opinion at all about the effectiveness of postKelo reform in their states. Id.
43 Id. at 46 tbl.6.
44 Id. at 45.
45 For summaries of the data, see, e.g., SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2003); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT
AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996);

Somin, Political

Ignorance,supra note 13.
46llya Somin, When Ignorance Isn't Bliss: How Political Ignorance Threatens
Democracy, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 525, Sept. 22, 2004, at 6 tbl.1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=2372 [hereinafter Somin, When Ignorance Isn't
Bliss].
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ignorance is so widespread despite the immense public outcry that the
issue has generated.
2. Ignoranceas an Explanationfor the Limited Impact of the Kelo
Backlash
Widespread public ignorance about post-Kelo reform helps explain
why so many of the new laws have been ineffective. Public ignorance
is also the best available explanation for the seeming scarcity of
effective post-Kelo reform laws. The highly publicized Supreme
Court decision apparently increased awareness of the problem of
eminent domain abuse, perhaps as a result of extensive press
coverage. That fact helps explain why Kelo produced such an outcry
despite the reality that it made little change in existing precedent and
that economic development takings had gone on for decades before
with relatively little public outcry.4 7 But while the publicity
surrounding Kelo made much of the public at least somewhat aware
of the issue of economic development takings, it probably did not
lead voters to closely scrutinize the details of proposed reform
legislation. After all, the Saint Index survey showed that almost 80%
of Americans do not even know whether their state has passed a
reform law at all.48
Few citizens have the time or inclination to delve into such matters
and many are often ignorant of the very existence of even the most
important legislative items.49 Thus, it would not be difficult for state
legislators to seek to satisfy voter demands by supporting
"position-taking" legislation that purported to curb eminent domain,5 °
while in reality having little effect. In this way, they can
simultaneously cater to public outrage over Kelo and mollify
developers and other interest groups that benefit from economic
development condemnations.
This strategy seems to have been at the root of the failure of
post-Kelo reform efforts in California. In that state, legislative reform
efforts were initially sidetracked by the introduction of weak
proposals that gave legislators "a chance . . .to side with the antieminent domain sentiment without doing any real damage to

47 Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 51-52.
48 See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., Somin, When Ignorance Isn't Bliss, supra note 46, at 6 tbl. 1 (providing data

that the majority of citizens are unaware of the very existence of several of the most important
pieces of legislation adopted by Congress in recent years).
50 For the concept of position-taking legislation, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
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redevelopment agencies."'', At a later stage in the political battle, the
Democratic majority in the state legislature tabled even these modest
reforms by claiming that they were being blocked by the Republican
minority, despite the fact that "the stalled bills required only simple
majority votes and thus needed no Republicans to go along.",52 As one
Sacramento political reporter put it, the entire process may have been
"just a feint to pretend to do something about eminent domain without
actually doing anything to upset the apple cart.",53 Eventually,
California did enact some reforms, but only ones that are almost
completely ineffective.54 A leading advocate for eminent domain
reform in Nevada also believes that, in his state as well, legislators
sought to "look good while not upsetting anyone. ' 55
The California League of Cities (the "CLC"), an organization
composed of local governments with an interest in preserving their
eminent domain authority, has also sought to exploit political
ignorance about post-Kelo reform. In 2007, The CLC succeeded in
placing Proposition 99, an essentially ineffective eminent domain
"reform" referendum initiative, on the state's June 2008 ballot as a
way of pre-empting Proposition 98, a stronger referendum initiative
sponsored by property rights advocates. The CLC-sponsored initiative
cleverly included a provision stating that it would supersede any other
eminent domain referendum enacted on the same day, so long as the
latter gets fewer votes than the CLC proposal.5 6
In the end, Proposition 98 was defeated outright by the voters. At
this time, it is difficult to tell whether Proposition 98 was defeated
because of the availability of Proposition 99 as a seemingly effective
alternative, or whether it failed primarily because, in addition to its
eminent domain provisions, it included an unpopular phaseout of rent

51Dan Waiters, Eminent Domain Bills Are Stalled-Except One for Casino Tribe,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A3.
52 Id.

53Id.
54See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 25-26.
55Interview with Steven Miller, Nevada Policy Research Institute (Mar. 14, 2007).
Nevada eventually passed effective eminent domain reform by referendum. See supra note 3
and accompanying text.
56 For the text of Proposition 99, see Letter from Christopher K. McKenzie to Judge
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, California (May 10, 2007), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cmspdfs/initiatives/2007-05-14_07-0018_lnitiative.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2008). The provision negating other eminent domain reform laws passed the same day is
Section 9. For discussion of the reasons why Proposition 99 does not actually provide any
meaningful protection for property owners, see llya Somin, Prop. 99's False Promise of
Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2008, at A15 and Posting of Ilya Somin, The California League of
Cities' Deceptive Eminent Domain "Reform" Referendum Initiative, to The Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/I175462916.shtrnl (Apr. 1, 2007, 17:28 EST).
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control.5 7 Quite likely, both played a role. The rent control provision
probably caused some voters to oppose Proposition 98 who might
otherwise have supported it. Proposition 99, for its part, may have led
swing voters to believe (wrongly) that Proposition 99 offered an
alternative to Proposition 98 that would curb economic development
takings without affecting rent control.
In any event, the use of an ineffective "reform" initiative to block a
potentially effective competitor is an indication that supporters of
unrestricted eminent domain power have sought to turn political
ignorance to their advantage.
Such maneuvers as Proposition 99 would be difficult to pull off if
the public paid close attention to pending legislation. In that event,
voters would have recognized that Proposition 99 would have little or
no effect on eminent domain, and would also have understood that
voting for it would end up blocking a reform measure that would have
actually eliminated economic development takings. But tactics of this
kind can be effective in the presence of widespread political
ignorance, as the passage of Proposition 99 suggests. Unfortunately,
public ignorance of the details of eminent domain policy is unlikely to
be easily remedied.
A possible alternative explanation for the scarcity of effective
reform laws is the political power of developers and other organized
interest groups that benefit from the transfer of property condemned
as a result of economic development and blight condemnations.58
There is little question that this factor does play a role. Developers,
local government planning officials, and other interest groups have
indeed spearheaded opposition to post-Kelo reform.5 9 In Texas, for
example, advocates of strong eminent domain reform concluded that
lobbying by developers and local governments played a key role in
ensuring that the state passed an essentially toothless reform law.6 °
However, the mere existence of interest group opposition does not
explain why state legislators would choose to satisfy a few small
interest groups while going against the preferences of the vast

57Opponents of Proposition 98 focused on the rent control issue in their efforts to
defeat it. I have discussed the political impact of the rent control issue on The Volokh
Conspiracy weblog. Posting of Ilya Somin, Causes of the Defeat of Proposition 98,
to
The
Volokh
Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_06_012008 06 07.shtml#1212612106 (June 4, 2008, 16:41 EST).
58See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 709, 769-72 (arguing that interest group
opposition accounts for the many ineffective laws enacted during the Kelo backlash).
59Id.

60Interview with Brooke Rollins, Texas Public Policy Foundation (Mar. 17, 2007).
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majority of the electorate. 6' It is possible that the pro-condemnation
interest groups simply have more intense preferences about the issue
than most of the opponents in the general public and are therefore
more likely to cast their votes based on politicians' stances on the
issue. However, 63% of the respondents in the 2005 Saint Index
survey said that they not only opposed Kelo, but felt "strongly" about
it;6 2 more recent survey data shows that 43% of Americans "strongly"
63
support reform legislation banning economic development takings.
If even a fraction of that 63% were willing to let post-Kelo reform
influence their voting decisions, they would probably constitute a
much larger voting bloc than all of the pro-Kelo developers and
government officials put together.
For this reason, it is likely that, to the extent that interest group
opposition was able to stymie effective post-Kelo reform and force
the passage of merely cosmetic legislation, this result occurred only
because most ordinary voters are unaware of what is happening.
CONCLUSION

Political ignorance both exacerbates the harm caused by economic
development takings and makes it difficult to restrict such takings
through legislation-even during a period of massive public anger
against the use of eminent domain. It would be wrong to assume that
the Kelo backlash has been wholly ineffective. Fourteen state
legislatures have passed relatively strong laws that either curb or
abolish economic development takings, including a handful that had
an extensive prior record of utilizing such condemnations. 64 Several
other states have enacted strong reforms by referendum. 65 For reasons
I have discussed in detail elsewhere, the relatively greater
effectiveness of reforms enacted by referendum supports the broader
public ignorance explanation of the Kelo backlash and its impact.6 6
Nonetheless, the combined impact of political ignorance on both
economic development takings and legislative efforts to abolish such
takings makes it highly unlikely that the political process can curb
such condemnations as effectively as many expect. A truly effective

See survey data cited supra Part I.B.
62See supra notes 26-27.
63See Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Badfor the Poor?, supra note 29, at
1940 tbl.2.
64 See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supranote 3, at 31-37.
65 Id. at 34-37.
61

66 Id. at 53-54.
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takings probably requires judicial as well as
ban on Kelo-style
67
legislative action.

67

I defend this conclusion at greater length in Somin, GraspingHand,supra note 1.

